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Semantic Holism and Word Representations
in Artificial Neural Networks
Toma´sˇ Musil1
Abstract. Artificial neural networks are a state-of-the-art solu-
tion for many problems in natural language processing. What can
we learn about language and meaning from the way artificial neu-
ral networks represent it? Word representations obtained from the
Skip-gram variant of the word2vec model exhibit interesting seman-
tic properties. This is usually explained by referring to the general
distributional hypothesis, which states that the meaning of the word
is given by the contexts where it occurs. We propose a more specific
approach based on Frege’s holistic and functional approach to mean-
ing. Taking Tugendhat’s formal reinterpretation of Frege’s work as a
starting point, we demonstrate that it is analogical to the process of
training the Skip-gram model and offers a possible explanation of its
semantic properties.
1 INTRODUCTION
Meaning is, therefore, something that words have in sentences; and
it’s something that sentences have in a language. [8] On the other
hand, meaning could also be something that words have on their
own, with sentences being compositions and language a collection
of words. This is the question of semantic holism versus atomism,
which was important in the philosophy of language in the second
half of the 20th century and has not been satisfyingly answered yet.
Artificial neural networks are the state-of-the-art solution for many
problems in natural language processing (and machine learning in
general). They produce word representation with interesting proper-
ties, but the way they work is little understood from the perspective
of linguistics or the philosophy of language.
We believe that by finding parallels between concepts in AI and
the philosophy of language, we can better understand both areas.
In this paper, we present an analogy between meaning defined as
truth-value potential (a reformulation of Fregean holistic and func-
tional approach) and a variant of language representation model,
therefore pointing out a possibility that its striking syntactic and se-
mantic properties [18] are formed due to adhering to holistic princi-
ples.
1.1 Related work
We have found only one work concerning the philosophical aspects
of neural language models [14]. It is, however, concentrating on Self-
Organizing Maps and Quine’s version of semantic holism.
There are papers showing that Skip-gram with negative sampling
is implicitly a factorization of a word-context matrix (e.g. [15], al-
though this result was later contested by various authors, such as
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[1] and [21]), or deriving the equations in an alternative way [11]
(discussed more in Section 3). This may tell us something about the
model, but it does not answer the principal question: why should the
matrix factorized in a certain way contain semantic information?
2 SEMANTIC HOLISM AND ATOMISM
Semantic holism (or meaning holism) is the thesis that what a linguis-
tic expression means depends on its relations to many or all other
expressions within the same totality. [. . . ] The totality in question
may be the language to which the expressions belong, or a theory
formulation in that language. [19] The opposing view is called se-
mantic atomism, and it claims that there are expressions (typically
words), whose meaning does not depend on the meaning of other ex-
pressions. The meaning of these expressions is given by something
outside language (e.g. their relation to physical or mental objects).
In the following sections, we will specify the implications of both
alternatives for semantics. The question also plays a role in cognitive
science (content identity and similarity), epistemology (commensu-
rability of theories) and seems to be strongly connected with the an-
alytic/synthetic distinction [8].
There are other positions in between these two, such as semantic
molecularism or the belief that neither relations external nor internal
are primary in forming meaning. However, to keep this text simple,
we will only concentrate on extreme positions. We will also only talk
about words, although the same argument can be used with smaller
meaningful language units (e.g. parts of a compound word).
Our goal is not to asses whether the truth lies with holism, atomism
or neither of them. We will only show that holism is a useful perspec-
tive when understanding neural language models is concerned.
Before we get into details of the two perspectives, let us point
out two critical aspects of their difference: holism proclaims inter-
dependence of meanings of words, contrary to their independence in
atomism. And holism favours decomposition over composition.
2.1 Atomism
It is a widely held view that much of the history of the philosophy
of language consists of a failed attempt to make semantic atomism
work. [8, p. 32]
Atomism played an important role in analytic philosophy, starting
with Bertrand Russell’s logical atomism and continuing with logical
positivism, as exemplified in this quote by Carnap [3]:
A language consists of a vocabulary and a syntax, i.e. a set of
words which have meanings and rules of sentence formation.
These rules indicate how sentences may be formed out of the
various sorts of words.
For logical positivists, words have meaning, because they refer to
objects (be it physical, sensual, logical, mathematical or other). The
rules of composition determine the meaning of sentences (and rule
out senseless sequences of words).
Under this (or similar) view, the fact that words refer to the outside
world is presupposed. Their references are independent of each other
(that dog refers to dog is independent of that horse refers to horse).
There is strong emphasis on compositionality, that reached its peak
in Chomskian linguistics and is still relevant today.
Crucially, this means that a word can have meaning on its own
(e.g. by referring to something). The meaning of larger units, such as
sentences, is derived by the rules of composition from the meaning
of words.
2.2 Holism
Semantic holism accents the interdependence of meaning. The whole
(language, theory, . . . ) is the primary vehicle of meaning. The mean-
ing of smaller units is derived by decomposition.
This view is motivated by the same word having a different mean-
ing in a different context. Gottlob Frege has shown [9] that even such
seemingly unambiguous words as numbers play distinct roles in dif-
ferent situations: 5 is a prime number and there are 5 cows on the
meadow are different at least in that the first 5 signifies a complete
(abstract) object, while the second one needs to be supplemented
with information that it is cattle of which there are 5 specimens, oth-
erwise the expression would not be grammatical.
Frege promoted what we could call sentence holism: Only in the
context of a sentence does a word have a meaning. [10] We will later
use its modern reformulation to show an analogy with certain neural
language models and therefore their holistic character.
Another group of arguments for holism consist of variations on
the theme of impossibility of knowing or using a word without being
able to use other words. For example, it could be argued that a per-
son could not correctly use the word mammal, without also knowing
(at least some of) bird, animal and kinds of animals. Therefore the
meaning of words cannot be formed in isolation.
Something that is harder to explain under holism than under atom-
ism is the fact that words refer to objects. If the meaning of words
is given by other words, how is it connected to the world around us?
However, not all words refer to something. And even if subscribing
to holism makes explaining reference harder, it may be because it is
a hard problem to explain.
Another thing that is simpler under atomism is compositionality.
While in atomism it plays a central role as one of the presupposed
properties of language, holism may not need it. But it does not claim
that words do not have meanining at all, only that it is derived (by
some sort of decomposition) from the meaning of the whole.
3 WORD REPRESENTATIONS IN AI
Although all artificial neural networks that work with language must
have some way of representing it, the most interesting representa-
tions come from neural language models. Language modelling is a
task of predicting a missing word from a sequence or generating text.
There is also a similar class of models that are designed specifically
to produce representations of language units, which we will call neu-
ral language representation models.
The representations (also called embeddings) are high dimensional
vectors of real numbers. They are either learned together with the rest
of the network for the particular task or pretrained by a general lan-
guage representation model (typically on a larger dataset not specific
for the task).
Some neural language (representation) models produce represen-
tation with semantic properties, although the task of language mod-
eling itself is not (at least at the first sight) directly connected with
semantics and no explicit semantic annotation is given to the neural
network.
These semantic properties became popular with the invention of
the word2vec software and the Skip-gram model, whose author
said about it [18]:
The model itself has no knowledge of syntax or morphology
or semantics. Remarkably, training such a purely lexical model
to maximize likelihood will induce word representations with
striking syntactic and semantic properties.
However, they did not present any explanation of the phenomenon.
Goldberg and Levy [11] present a detailed derivation of the central
equation of the Skip-gram model. In the last section they say:
Why does this produce good word representations?
Good question. We don’t really know.
The distributional hypothesis states that words in similar con-
texts have similar meanings. The objective [of the Skip-gram
model] clearly tries to increase the [dot product of the context
and the word representations] for good word-context pairs, and
decrease it for bad ones. Intuitively, this means that words that
share many contexts will be similar to each other (note also that
contexts sharing many words will also be similar to each other).
This is, however, very hand-wavy. Can we make this intuition
more precise? We’d really like to see something more formal.
We believe that the implicit holistic component of this hand-wavy
approach is central to the quality of Skip-gram representations and
we can make the intuitionmore precise by analogy with the definition
of the truth-value potential.
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QUEEN
Figure 1. Examples of embeddings semantic relations according to [18].
3.1 Semantic properties of the Skip-Gram model
The Skip-gram model was introduced by Tom Mikolov et al. [16] as
a method to efficiently train word embeddings. It exceeded state-of-
the-art in various semantic tasks. The embeddings have interesting
semantic properties, most notably the vector arithmetic illustrated by
Figure 1 and the following equation [18]:
vking − vman + vwoman ≈ vqueen.
meaning that starting with the word king, if we subtract the vector
for the word man and add the vector for the word woman, the nearest
vector in the embedding space will be the one that corresponds to the
word queen. This means that queen is to woman as king is to man.
Hollis et al. [13] show that it is possible to infer various psycholin-
guistic and semantic properties of words from the Skip-gram em-
beddings. Mikolov et al. [17] also trained the Skip-gram model with
phrases, resulting in even simpler and more elegant equations, such
as
vGermany + vcapital ≈ vBerlin.
Mikolov et al. [16] proposed another shallow neural language
model, Continuous Bag of Words (CBOW). The main difference be-
tween CBOW and Skip-gram (see Figure 2) is that while Skip-gram
predicts context words from a given word, CBOW predicts a word
from a given context.
CBOW Skip-gram
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Figure 2. CBOW and Skip-gram language models according to [16].
4 RELEVANT THEORIES OF MEANING
In this section, we discuss theories of meaning that are relevant to
word representations in artificial neural networks. Notice that even
though they strictly speaking do not require meaning holism, they all
lean towards it quite strongly.
4.1 The distributional hypothesis
Holism is generally a better alternative in cases where there is noth-
ing beside language itself to anchor meaning to. This is the case of
neural language (representation) models. If they represent meaning
at all, it must be derived from the training corpus. This may be the
reason behind the popularity of the distributional hypothesis in neu-
ral language model literature. The famous saying by Firth [7], “You
shall know a word by the company it keeps!”, is quoted in majority
of papers concerned with vector space models of language.
The general distributional hypothesis states that the meaning of a
word is given by the contexts in which it occurs. It is, however, worth
noticing that in Firth’s theory, collocation is just one among multiple
levels of meaning and his text does not support the idea of meaning
based on context alone.
A more suitable formulation of the distributional hypothesis (ref-
erenced in connection to Skip-gram in [2]) is found in Distributional
structure [12], where it is suggested that distribution may be used for
comparing meanings and that difference of meaning correlates with
difference of distribution.
Although this certainly describes a basic principle of neural lan-
guage models, it is still rather vague.
4.2 The use theory of meaning
The use theory of meaning can be summed up as the meaning of a
word is its use in the language [22, § 43]. It is associated with late
Wittgenstein’s concept of language game. In Philosophical Investi-
gations [22, §§ 499–500], he writes:
To say “This combination of words makes no sense” excludes it
from the sphere of language and thereby bounds the domain of
language. [. . . ] When a sentence is called senseless, it is not as
it were its sense that is senseless. But a combination of words is
being excluded from the language, withdrawn from circulation.
This bounding of the domain of language is precisely what language
model does, therefore the use theory may be one way to connect
language modelling and semantics.
That knowledge of language emerges from language use is also
one of main hypotheses of cognitive linguistics [4].
4.3 Structuralism
In structuralism [5], the meaning of a word is given by its relation to
the other words of the language:
The elements of a structure have neither extrinsic designation,
nor intrinsic signification. Then what is left? [. . . ] [N]othing
other than a sense [. . . ]: a sense which is necessarily and
uniquely positional. [6]
This holds for word representations in artificial neural networks as
well. The vectors representing the words do not have any other mean-
ing than their position among the rest of the vectors and a single vec-
tor does not have any significance outside the model. This is also
demonstrated by the vectors being different every time the model is
trained because of random initialization.
5 SKIP-GRAM AND TRUTH-VALUE
POTENTIAL
In this section, we introduce the truth-value potential and show that
Skip-gram corresponds to it better than CBOW.
5.1 The truth-value potential
Tugendhat’s compact reformulation of Frege’s sentence holism, the
definition of meaning as truth-value potential is [20]:
[T]wo expressions φ and ψ have the same truth-value potential
if and only if, whenever each is completed by the same ex-
pression to form a sentence, the two sentences have the same
truth-value.
We can also express this definition in the following form:
M(ϕ) =M(ψ) ⇐⇒ ∀x : T (x(ϕ)) = T (x(ψ)),
whereM is the truth-value potential (meaning), T is the truth-value
of the sentence and x(ω) is the result of completing the expression ω
by the expression x to form a sentence.
One important aspect of this definition is that, following Frege
[10], it is based on an assumption that the sentence (or rather the
corresponding judgement) is the basic unit of meaning.
5.2 Word2vec models and semantic holism
The definition of meaning as truth-value potential is analogous to the
process of training a model for word representations. One difference
is that when we are training a model, we do not have the whole of
language at our disposal. Even after approximating the language with
a finite corpus, it still is not practical to compare all the contexts for
a given word at the same time, therefore the universal quantifier has
to be replaced by an iterative process of examining the contexts one
by one (or actually batch by batch, which is a step back towards
the totality that is being estimated). And we have no means to asses
whether the sentences from the corpus are true or false. We can either
assume that they are mostly true, or try to replace the concept of
truth with something else (maybe language use). Even the first option
seems to be enough—imagine a corpus full of false sentences about
cats, e.g. Cats can fly., Cats are cetaceans. etc. We cannot expect the
representation of the word cats in a model trained on this corpus to be
any good, therefore the requirement for the corpus to consist mostly
of true sentences is not excessive.
The simplest model that corresponds to this analogy is the Skip-
gram model. It does just what is described in the definition – it fixes
a word and goes through all the possible contexts. It compares the
words based on the context. The context words are predicted and
their representations are fixed (in a single training step), while the
representation of a single word is learned. By learning the represen-
tation of a word from the representation of the context, Skip-gram
complies to the principles of semantic holism. The analogy between
the definition of truth-value potential and the process of training the
Skip-gram model is one possible explanation for its semantic prop-
erties and its performance in semantic tasks.
The complementary CBOW architecture (see Figure 2) performs
much worse in the evaluation of the semantic tasks [16]. In CBOW,
a missing word is predicted from its context. Therefore, in a single
learning step, the representation of the missing word is fixed. What
changes (and is learned) is the representation of the context words.
By learning the representation of the context from the representation
of the word, CBOW is implicitly conforming to semantic atomism:
words are the basic units of meaning and the meaning of the broader
context is derived from the atomic meaning of words. This may be
the reason why CBOW does not exhibit the same semantic properties
as Skip-gram and it performs worse in semantic tasks.
6 CONCLUSION AND FUTUREWORK
The distributional hypothesis as an explanation for the semantic
properties of neural language models should be expanded into a more
detailed account. We show one possible way to do that via a Fregean
approach to meaning.
Both the distributional hypothesis itself and Tugendhat’s interpre-
tation of Frege’s work are examples of holistic approaches to mean-
ing, where the meaning of the whole determines the meaning of
parts. As we demonstrated on the opposition between Skip-gram and
CBOW models, the distinction between semantic holism and atom-
ism may play an essential role in semantic properties of neural lan-
guage representations models.
We have demonstrated the connection between the Skip-gram
model and the definition of meaning as truth-value potential. Al-
though this is an isolated observation of an analogy between a spe-
cific model and a specific theory about meaning, it is a crucial step
towards finding a theory of meaning that would correspond to the
current results of NLP research, increasing our understanding of NLP
and ultimately the language itself.
The direction of research from successful language technologies
to properties of language itself offers many opportunities for inquiry,
with very few being explored so far.
Many state-of-the-art models for natural language processing use
smaller units than words for their input and output. This analysis
could be extended to take this into account.
It might also be interesting to think about the philosophy of sci-
ence in technical fields dominated by machine learning, but that is
far beyond the scope of this paper.
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